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Abstract 
Why and how do business interests succeed at blocking proposals they oppose? In recent years the 
European Commission has introduced a number of measures as part of its overall strategy to improve 
the position of women in the labour force. Two high profile proposals made by the Commission, 
namely a Directive to achieve gender balance in company boardrooms and a Directive to standardise 
maternity leave standards, did not materialise into legislation. Both proposals failed to gain the 
necessary support in the Council. This is notable, because proposals made by the Commission are 
rarely blocked. Previous studies of cases where proposals are blocked focused on the role of trade 
unions in stopping proposals. But business interests are likely to employ different tactics in lobbying. 
Therefore, this raises the question: Why and how do ‘business interests’ succeed at lobbying and 
blocking EU proposals? Lobbying outcomes are explained by factors in three categories : first, interest 
group characteristics and resources such as citizen support, economic power or expertise might explain 
success. Second, the informational demands of the European Union’s institutional actors, combined 
with the multitude of access points are said to structure lobbying outcomes. Issue level variables, e.g. 
policy type, saliency and the conflictual nature of the proposal, make up a third category. Studying the 
Gender Balance Directive using the process-tracing method, the validity of these three explanations is 
tested. Business interests were successful in attaining their goals in the Gender Balance Directive 
because their position lined up with Member State concerns about the Directive’s compliance with 
proportionality and subsidiarity.  
Introduction 
 
There is an abundance of research on business interest groups and their role in EU policymaking. 
Concerns about their influence and the possible ways in which they might bias EU policy contribute to 
perceptions that the EU as a project exists to serve business interests. These concerns add fuel to the 
discussions about the democratic deficit in the European Union (Beyers et al, 2008: p. 1109: 
Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011: p. 147-148). Business interests are said to enjoy a privileged position in 
the EU’s legislative process (Eising, 2007: p. 399). This position is the result of their extensive access 
to policymakers in the EU and the valuable information they can provide policymakers (Klüver 2013: 
p. 68). This aids them in meeting the various demands of the institutional actors in the European 
Union (Klüver, Braun & Beyers, 2015; Bouwen, 2003: p. 2).      
 Recently, this image of business groups’ influence in EU policymaking has been challenged. 
Following a trend from interest group studies in the US, researchers of EU interest group politics have 
utilized quantitative research designs to study EU lobbying. Through quantitative research, scholars 
have identified general patterns. These studies paint a more nuanced picture of business’ influence in 
EU policymaking (Dür, Bernhagen & Marshall, 2015; Klüver, 2012). According to these studies 
business interests are not nearly as potent as previously thought. Citizen’s groups, advocating for more 
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diffuse and broader and immaterial interests are, given the right circumstances, just as or even more 
successful than business groups. In those instances citizen groups and diffuse interests are able to 
leverage their resources, mobilize more people and have a larger impact on policy than business 
interests. Moreover, some argue that interest groups’ influence is less far-reaching than previously 
thought: they are not able to change the fundamental character of proposals (Dür, 2008: p. 1219). 
Instead, business interests find themselves trying to modify EU initiatives, which are more often than 
not going to be regulatory in nature. Regulations almost always constitute a restriction on firms’ 
capacity to conduct their business. For this reason Dür et al (2015) argue that business interests are 
usually preoccupied with damage mitigation.       
 Furthermore, once the Commission announces a formal proposal, the likelihood of it 
eventually becoming law is quite high in the EU (Baumgartner, 2007: p. 486; Leiren & Parks, 2014: p. 
465; Dür et al, 2015: p. 957). Instances where proposals are blocked thus constitute the exception. The 
mixed findings about business influence in the EU and the fact that proposals are rarely blocked raises 
an interesting question: why and how does the business lobby— firms, national business associations 
and European business associations– succeed at lobbying and blocking proposals they oppose? No 
previous study has addressed this particular question. Other studies have examined the ways in which 
business interests lobby the EU’s institutions (Coen, 2009; Coen, 1999; Eising, 2007). Leiren & Parks’ 
study (2014) comes closest to answering this question. They examine instances where trade unions are 
successful in blocking proposals. They find that lack of access to the EU’s institutions does not 
remove the potency of unions’ lobbying efforts. They suggest effective framing and the political 
opportunity structures of the EU’s institutions as answers for why trade unions succeeded. The 
effective framing of problems and solutions helps mobilize actors and builds support for one’s 
position. Political opportunity structures refers to the institutional access points that affect 
mobilization and efforts to influence (Leiren & Parks: 2014: p. 466). Leiren and Parks conclude that 
excluding trade unions from consultations led to them mobilising in more ‘contentious’ ways, by 
staging protests for example. But this explanation is less suited for cases where business interests are 
successful in blocking proposals. Business interests tend to employ ‘insider strategies’, i.e. focusing on 
getting access to policymakers, when lobbying the EU’s institutions (Dür et al, 2015a: p. 958; Dür & 
Matteo: 2013: p. 674). As such, they are unlikely to resort to the same type of grassroots mobilising 
tactics that the unions did (Leiren & Parks: 2014: p. 469). So, answering this question can provide 
further insight into the ways in which business interests lobby. Besides providing further insight into 
strategies employed by business interests, answering this question can also lead to more a complete 
picture of business influence in the EU and help identify the reasons why proposals fail.  
 Studies of interest group politics in the EU have resulted in contradictory findings, with 
studies concluding that business interests have a competitive edge due to EU policymakers often 
requiring economic and technical expertise (Eising, 2007). Others suggest that citizen groups have a 
structural advantages over business and attain their goals more often (Dür et al, 2015), or some 
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concluding that interest group type does not seem to matter at all in predicting lobbying success 
(Klüver, 2012). This is a consequence of studies focussing on one aspect of lobbying, or only 
researching one stage of the policy process. To identify why business interests are successful in 
blocking proposals they oppose, a comprehensive framework is necessary. Klüver, Braun and Beyers 
(2015) and Mahoney (2007; 2008) provide such a template. This framework for studying legislative 
lobbying in the EU proposes variables at three levels as determining lobbying strategy and outcomes: 
the interest group level, the institutional level and the issue level.    
 The question of business interests’ ability to block legislation will be examined in the 
remainder of this thesis. First, a brief overview of the interest group literature thus far shall be 
provided. In the overview working definitions of lobbying, influence and interest group will be 
provided. This is followed by a review of findings of lobbying researchers. Subsequently, the three 
categories of factors affecting interest group success and lobbying outcomes are discussed. Next, the 
methodology, data selection and case selection are presented. Lastly, the data will be analysed and 
discussed.                                                                                                                 
Interest groups, lobbying and influence 
 
Interest groups 
 
Interest group scholars have used different definitions of the concept ‘interest group’. Some employ a 
behavioural definition, choosing to classify groups as interest groups if they engage in lobbying i.e. 
trying to influence public policy. While this definition seems succinct and complete, it is flawed in that 
interest groups are not the only actors who engage in lobbying. Individuals and groups that we would 
intuitively not classify as interest groups are often also engaged in the business of influencing others. 
Think for example of individuals or firms who advocate for policy change. Such a definition would 
therefore be too broad. Therefore other studies employ a stricter definition of the concept ‘interest 
group’, namely, based on their organizational structure. According to this stricter definition, groups 
can be considered interest groups if they are membership based (Baroni et al, 2014: pp. 144-145). Two 
important addendums to these definitions are provided by Beyers, Eising and Mahoney (2008: p. 
1106). They state that interest groups are (1) organisations, distinguishing them from social 
movements; that (2) interest groups are policy oriented, they work towards influencing policy; (3) 
interest groups are informal, i.e. they are not office-seeking.     
 A way to distinguish between interest groups is the type of interests they advocate for. Dür 
and Mateo (2013: p. 663) differentiate between business associations, professional associations and 
citizens groups. While Beyers (2002: p. 589) distinguishes between groups advocating for specific 
interests or groups advocating for diffuse interests. Klüver (2012; 2015: p. 485) in turn speaks of cause 
and sectional groups. These three different classification schemes have a great deal of overlap. For all 
intents and purposes the terms cause groups, diffuse interest and citizen groups refer to the same types 
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of interest groups. These groups advocate for broader causes, for which the constituency is ill-defined 
and not clearly demarcated. The groups and causes they advocate for often do not stand to gain 
materially from their lobbying efforts and are therefore more difficult to mobilize. The terms sectional 
group and specific interest groups for their part also refer to the same type of groups. Business 
associations and professional associations are examples of sectional and specific interest groups. 
These groups advocate for the interests of a clearly defined constituency, trying to accrue economic 
benefits or prevent costs for this group. For the purposes of this study the classification scheme of 
Beyers (2002) seems most appropriate as it differentiates between business associations and 
professional associations. Business associations and professional associations can both be further 
disaggregated. Business associations in particular may represent the interests of firms and employers 
in an individual sector, or they can represent their interests in multiple sectors. The same applies to 
professional associations. Professional associations represent the interests of individuals working in a 
specific sector, or they can represent the interests of workers across different sectors. 
Lobbying 
 
Interest group scholars often do not bother defining lobbying, instead describing acts that are related to 
the act of lobbying, such as framing and information transmission by interest groups (Woll, 2006: p. 
463), or attempts to gain access or access itself as evidence of lobbying (Bouwers, 2002: p. 366; 
Eising, 2007). De Figueiredo and Richter (2014: p. 164) define lobbying as “the transfer of 
information in private meetings and venues between interest groups and politicians, their staffs, and 
agents”. The key elements of this definition, transfer of information between interest groups and 
politicians, capture the different activities studied by interest group scholars studying lobbying. An 
important aspect of this definition is that lobbying is done by interest groups. That is what 
distinguishes lobbying from advocacy, which is the petitioning of public officials by (groups) of 
private citizens. Governments for example also respond to EC consultations. It is also noted by for 
example Baumgartner (2007: p. 482), or by Panke (2012) and Rozbicka (2013: p. 844) that 
governments and public officials, such as bureaucrats in the EC, are also active in lobbying for policy 
change. Especially in the EU, Member States often lobby other Member States, MEPs and 
Commission officials to change proposals or change policy. Hence, lobbying outcomes cannot be 
entirely explained without taking this dimension into account. The lobbying impact of business 
interest groups could be the result of allied Member States advocating their position. Also, business 
interest groups and Member states are not the only ones lobbying in favour of business interests. In 
many cases, firms are actively lobbying to advance their interests as well (Coen, 1998; 2009). 
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Influence    
 
Influence is also a difficult concept to define and operationalize. As such many scholars often sidestep 
this question, focussing rather on access, or other more observable and more indirect ways of 
measuring influence. The easiest way of defining influence is defining influence as the ability to 
change public policy to be more in line with your preference. Klüver (2012; 2013a; 2013b) and Dür et 
al (2015) focus on lobbying success, meaning congruence between the actual outcome of the 
legislative process and the preferences of individual interest groups. They identify policy positions of 
interest groups and place them on a one-dimensional left-right scale. Dür et al (2015) do this by 
gathering policy positions and ideal points based on interviews, Klüver performs quantitative analysis 
of Commission consultations to identify positions. An alternative way of gaging influence is asking 
actors for their subjective perceptions of their own influence, as well as how influential they think 
other actors are. Others sidestep the question of influence and instead infer from the amount of access 
that actors have how influential they are (or have the potential of being) (Eising, 2007). One  note 
about lobbying and the nature of influence sought in the EU need to be made: the EU has a distinctive 
lobbying culture. Groups lobbying the EU tend to take on constructive positions and are often 
consensus-seeking (Woll, 2006: p. 463; Mahoney, 2007: p. 37). This culture is reflected in the types of 
goals groups seek in the EU. There are few groups who take on all-or-nothing positions.  
Determinants of Lobbying success 
 
Lobbying success is explained by three sets of factors. The first group of factors are the interest group 
level variables. The second set of factors are the institutional characteristics of the EU. The third set 
are issue level variables than can affect lobbying success and strategy (Klüver et al, 2015b; Mahoney, 
2008; Mahoney, 2007: pp. 40-41; Binderkrantz & Krøyer, 2012: p. 116). The first two categories can 
be thought of as a supply and demand side. Most accounts of EU lobbying describe lobbying as a 
bargaining process or exchange process. Interest groups and advocates offer resources (supply) which 
institutional actors within the EU need (demand). These institutions in turn return the favour by 
granting them access and considering their input (Bouwen, 2002: p. 368; Bouwen, 2009: p. 22; 
Mahoney, 2007; Coen, 2009: p. 146). Lobbying success is attributable, in part, to the ability of 
individual interest groups or coalitions to successfully meet the demands of EU institutions with their 
resources. For this reason Eising ( 2007: p. 386) speaks of relationships of ‘resource dependency’ In 
the rest of this section these three groups will be further discussed. Attention will be paid to how these 
categories explain lobbying success of interest groups in general and business interest groups in 
particular. 
Interest group variables 
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On the supply side, business interest groups offer a number of resources useful to policymakers. 
According to De Bruycker (2015) the main resource interest groups provide policymakers is 
information. De Bruycker argues that this information can be grouped into two broad categories of 
information: political information and expertise. Political information refers to the levels of public 
support or opposition to an initiative. It is information especially relevant to elected officials (De 
Bruycker, 2015: p. 600). The term expertise itself can be divided into a narrower set of information 
supplies. De Bruycker (p. 601) states that there are four types of expertise. Expertise provided can be 
technical, legal, administrative and economic in nature. First, technical expertise is knowledge about 
the feasibility and efficacy of a proposal. Second, economic expertise is knowledge of a proposal’s 
economic impact. Third, legal and administrative expertise refers to knowledge of the compatibility 
with treaties and process knowledge. Bouwen’s (2002; 2004) conceptualisation of information 
supplied by interest groups differs from De Bruycker’s. Bouwen (2004: pp. 467-477) examines three 
different types of access goods to gauge which type of business actors –firms, national business 
associations and European associations– might be best placed to supply them. Access goods are 
particular types of information groups offer in exchange for access to the policymaking process. He 
distinguishes among the following access goods: first, information about the domestic encompassing 
interest, i.e. information about the aggregate needs of a sector in the domestic market; the European 
encompassing interest information, this is information the effects of a proposal on a sector of the EU’s 
common market; and lastly, expert knowledge. Bouwen’s conceptualisation of the various 
‘encompassing interests’ is the political information business actors communicate to policymakers.
 Positions of individual interest groups or firm’s (and informational supply) may overlap with 
that of others groups lobbying the EU. For this reason an exclusive focus on efforts and information 
transmission by individual groups is likely misguided. Therefore, Klüver (2013b: p. 63) adds to the 
information-exchange model of lobbying by examining how aggregate information supplied by 
lobbying camps affects their ability to influence policy. Klüver’s study takes as a point of departure 
that EU lobbying is inherently a collective endeavour. Aggregate information supply is a resource 
provided by an entire camp, this variable can be disaggregated into information supplied by individual 
groups. In instances where a lot of stakeholders actively lobby, individual interest groups will likely be 
less impactful. The operationalization and theoretic justification of aggregate information has to be 
modified though. Klüver’s (2013b: pp. 67-68) reasoning goes as follows: the lobbying camp that is 
able to supply policymakers (in her study the focus was on the Commission) with the largest quantity 
of information will increase their odds of success. She measures aggregate information by comparing 
the word counts proponents and opponents of proposals in provide in the Commission’s consultations. 
But it is unlikely that policymakers consider the quantity of information supplied as a relevant factor. 
Especially since often, especially during the Commission consultations, most actors on the same side 
are likely going to provide similar information in response to the consultation requests. Instead, the 
focus should instead be shifted to the number of actors in one camp. That seems like a more realistic 
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metric policymakers might use.        
 Besides information supply, the size of the constituency represented by individual groups and 
coalitions matters. To this end Klüver (2013b: p. 63) also looks at the effects of citizen power and 
economic power on policy outcomes. While both are aggregate level variables that indicate lobbying 
camps’ constituency and importance to the European economy, they can be used at a disaggregated 
level. Citizen power is measured by the number of individuals represented by an interest group or a 
lobbying coalition. Economic power is a supply side variable business interests can leverage to 
influence policy. Economic power is likely to be the more relevant of the two for business interests. 
First of all, economic power potentially says something about the relative importance of individual 
firms or the business association members for the domestic economies of the Member States. A 
second reason why economic power can be relevant is that the availability of monetary resources 
allows actors to be active at multiple stages of the policy process. Economic power has been 
operationalised in different ways. Klüver (2013b: p. 68) measures economic power (of lobbying 
camps) as the annual turnover of companies and number of people employed by individual companies 
or sectors represented by association. Another way in which economic capabilities of business is 
measured is (Klüver, 2012: p. 1124; Mahoney, 2008: p. 60) as the number of employees active in 
lobbying for interest groups. Both economic power, citizen power and expertise affect business 
interests’ ability to influence policy: economic and citizen power says something about the means at 
their disposal, expertise says something about their input. For the purposes of this study these two 
variables will not be measured, as there is not enough variation in the number of cases to assess their 
effects.            
 A final interest group level variable that is said to affect lobbying strategy and outcome is the 
type of interest advocated for. This can affect the types of frames an interest group can credibly 
convey (Klüver et al, 2015a). Business associations objecting to a proposal because of its 
environmental harm would be less credible than for example environmental groups. So, these factor 
complement each other. Table 1 contains an overview of these variables. 
Table 1. Interest group level variables  
Subcategories of interest group level 
variables 
Interest group level 
variables 
Description 
Informational supply Expertise 
 
 
 
 
Domestic encompassing 
interest 
 
 
 
 
European Encompassing 
Legal, technical, 
administrative and or 
economic information useful 
to policymakers. 
 
Information about the 
effects of proposals on 
domestic economy and the 
positions of stakeholders in 
domestic context. 
 
Information about the 
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Interest 
 
effects of proposals on 
European economy and the 
positions of stakeholders. 
 
Economic resources Economic power Entails the staff size and 
annual turnover of actors. 
Higher levels of economic 
power lead to more success 
in lobbying. 
Member resources Citizen Power Refers to the size of the 
membership base of an 
organisation. Higher level of 
citizen power leads to 
greater success in lobbying. 
 
Type of interest advocated for Advocate type Interest group type affects 
the strategies and the range 
of frames a group can 
credibly convey 
 
Institutional factors 
 
The second category of factors that structure the EU’s interest group politics relates to the effects of 
the EU’s institutional setup on lobbying efforts. Of importance here are the various access points and 
demands of the different EU legislative bodies. The European Union’s institutional actors have 
different informational demands. Interest groups that can most adequately meet these demands are best 
positioned to influence policy outcomes. In this section a brief overview of the EU’s policy cycle is 
provided and afterward the most relevant access points for interest groups are described. 
 The course of the EU’s policy cycle is contingent on the procedure used to work on a policy. 
Depending on the procedure, the European Parliament can act as a co-equal legislator with the 
Council, or whether they merely need to be consulted. Most proposals nowadays are processed under 
the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011: p. 16). In the OLP the 
Commission starts the process by crafting a proposal. For most major legislation, the Commission 
conducts consultations with external stakeholders. These stakeholders can be public authorities, 
experts, interest groups or other relevant actors with a stake in the proposal. Once the Commission 
announces a proposal, the parliaments of the Member States can weigh in on whether the proposal is 
in compliance with the subsidiarity principle. This is known as the subsidiarity check (Lelieveldt & 
Princen, 2011: p. 99). In the OLP a proposal by the Commission needs the approval of both the 
Council and the European Parliament. The Parliament can also table amendments to the Commission’s 
proposal (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011: p. 86). For the purposes of this study, the case studied was 
processed under the OLP. The procedure used also affects the number of votes required to pass or 
block a proposal in the Council. When the OLP is used, the Council votes according to Qualified 
Majority (QMV). Under QMV, a blocking minority in the Council needs 45 percent of the Member 
States, representing more than 35 percent of the EU population to sustain a blocking minority. In other 
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areas the Council votes according to simple majority or on the basis of unanimity (Lelieveldt & 
Princen, 2011: p. 84). Figure 1 is an illustration of the OLP. It illustrates the process a proposal has to 
go through before becoming law.       
 Procedure is also said to affect policy outcomes. Dür et al (2015: p. 959) argues that the role of 
the European Parliament in the process affects the chances of business interests being success. Specific 
and sectional interests typically lobby executive agencies, such as the Council. Whereas citizen groups 
and cause groups tend to lobby via assemblies. So when the Parliament acts as a co-legislator in the 
co-decision procedure, citizen groups are more likely to be successful. If the EP only needs to be 
consulted and the Council plays a bigger role in policymaking, business is more likely to be 
successful. On the surface, however, this does not seem to have applied to the case studied in this 
thesis.`             
      Figure 1. The Ordinary legislative procedure 
     Source: Lelieveldt & Princen (2011: p. 87)  
 
The Commission is the actor charged with initiating the policy cycle. It has to be lobbied early in the 
process. Once proposals are made, altering them becomes progressively harder. As long as no concrete 
proposal has been formulated, prospects of influencing the content of legislation remain (Klüver, 
2013a: p. 156). Since the Commission is not elected, they require a form of output legitimacy, rather 
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than input legitimacy (Klüver, 2013a: p. 49; Woll, 2006: p. 459; Bouwen, 2009: p. 22). Moreover, as 
the Commission is relatively understaffed, it relies heavily on expertise provided by interest groups to 
ensure that proposals are workable, and are not shot down at a later stage because of technical 
difficulties with the legislation (Klüver, 2013a: p. 155; Greenwood, 2009: p. 94). The Commission has 
various resources in their arsenal with which to structure interest intermediation. The Commission’s 
governance style structures the way in which it processes policy and how it interacts with interest 
groups. The Commission processes policy proposals in sectorally organized committees called 
Directorates-Generals. These Committees in turn structure the consultations with external stakeholders 
(Bouwen, 2009: pp. 27-29). These committees have different administrative cultures, preferences and 
priorities (Klüver, 2015a: p. 453). So, whether a proposal is crafted by Directorate-General 
Environment, Agriculture or Climate can impact the degree to which officials are receptive to the 
frames provided by different interest groups. The same applies to the European Parliament and 
Council. So if a proposal is crafted by favourable Directorates-General, then interest groups can expect 
to be more successful (Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011: p. 243; Bernhagen, Dür & Marshal, 2015: p. 574). 
 The European Parliament makes different demands of groups lobbying it than the 
Commission. The Parliament has the greatest number of access points of the EU’s three main 
institutions. Each member constitutes a potential access point. A number of factors specific to the 
European Parliament structure lobbying and outcomes: first, Parliament proposals are worked on in 
committees; the committee working on a proposal appoints a rapporteur. In the event that multiple 
committees are involved, there are additional co-rapporteurs. The rapporteur is responsible for 
summarizing the committee’s opinions and writing a draft report incorporating the amendments 
(Lelieveldt & Princen, 2011: p. 73). The rapporteur has substantial influence as an agenda setter and 
potential gatekeeper. Having a favourable rapporteur can be very helpful in influencing the content of 
legislation as well as potentially stalling legislation (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2006: p. 6). Lastly, the 
fact that MEPs tend to vote with their European party groups also plays a role in lobbying the 
European Parliament (Lehmann, 2009: p.51; Klüver, 2013a: p. 181).   
 Lastly, the Council has different demands as well. The members of the Council, the individual 
ministers representing their country in one of the Council’s sectorally organized committees, represent 
a potential access point. Although they are the most difficult to access. Members of the Council are 
always mindful of their national interests. Hence, they are interested in information about domestic 
encompassing interests (Bouwen, 2002; 2004). A lot of decisions are made in preparatory bodies 
where national ministries contribute their technical expertise. Matters that require more political input 
are worked on by the committee of permanent representatives (COREPER), the ambassadors of 
Member States in Brussels and, eventually, the respective ministers. Furthermore, members of the 
Council are often lobbied indirectly. Interest groups lobby national parliaments, bureaucracies or 
ministers at the national level (Klüver, 2013a: p. 181). A last important access point for lobbyists is the 
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Council presidency. The presidency has agenda setting power and can speed up dossiers, or 
alternatively keep dossiers of the agenda of the Council (Hayes-Renshaw, 2009: p. 77).   
Issue level variables 
 
The third category of factors affecting lobbying outcomes pertains to the specific characteristics of 
policy proposals. As the list of relevant issue level variables is quite numerous, the variables have been 
divided into subcategories based on similarity.       
 The first subcategory of issue level variables consists of factors that affect the number of 
actors lobbying on a proposal. There is agreement about effects of saliency, the conflictual nature of 
proposal and scope of a proposal on interest group’s ability to influence proposals. Saliency refers to 
the amount of attention paid to an issue by policymakers and the public (Mahoney, 2008: p. 56), 
though others use an actor-centred approach to saliency. Saliency in that definition means something 
along the lines of how important an issue is to actors (Klüver et al, 2015b: p. 451). An issue is 
conflictual when the number of actors lobbying is higher and lobbying is contentious instead of 
consensual (Mahoney, 2008: p. 41). Salient and conflictual proposals decrease the likelihood of 
individual interest groups or narrow special interests being successful. As more actors become 
involved, as is the case in highly salient and conflictual issues, it becomes increasingly difficult for 
individual groups to convince policy makers of narrow self-serving frames and understandings of the 
issues. More actors being involved in a case means needing support to successfully influence a 
proposal, which makes participation in coalitions necessary. It also means that policymakers will 
consult a greater variety of groups representing a greater variety of views. The number of actors 
involved in lobbying on a dossier is also affected by the scope of a proposal. The scope of a proposal 
is the number of policy areas a proposal touches on. Mahoney (2008: p. 40) contends that when the 
scope of a proposal widens, more groups will engage in lobbying on a proposal. This is also something 
that Boräng and Naurin (2015: p. 502) find in their study of frame congruence between Commission 
officials and interest groups. Increased scope of conflict means less chance of narrow frames or 
understandings of issues being adopted by Commission officials.     
 The second subcategory of issue level variables relate to the content of the proposal. The 
relevant variables are complexity of the proposal and the policy type. Complexity refers to how much 
technical expertise is required to deal with a proposal. Moreover, as the scope of policy widens, an 
issue tends to become more complex. Complexity favours the side that offers the most expertise, this 
will tend to be business interests (Eising, 2007: p. 399). Policy type can affect lobbying processes and 
outcome. The policy type influences the procedure used to process proposals, the types of groups that 
mobilise, and can also impact strategy. Distinctions can be made between redistributive, distributive 
and regulative policies. We can expect business for example to mobilise en masse in opposition to 
regulations, while only a more limited number of citizen groups may mobilise in favour of that 
regulation (Klüver et al, 2015b: p. 451).         
13 
 
 Lastly, the history and background of an issue also structures lobbying. The history of an issue 
and nature of the status quo shape what interest groups can successfully advocate for (Baumgartner et 
al, 2009: p. 113 & p. 117; Klüver et al, 2015b: pp. 450-451). Policies do not emerge in a vacuum. 
Usually a proposal is amending an existing piece of legislation, or otherwise relitigating earlier policy 
battles. In understanding policy outcomes, the outcomes of earlier policy disputes have to be taken 
into account. Furthermore, Mahoney (2008: p. 41) contends that newer issues may garner more 
attention than more familiar and or rehashed issues. The nature of the status quo is significant because 
lobbying often devolves into two camps, one in favour and one opposed to the proposal. Whether 
groups are advocating for a change from the status quo or preservation of the status quo, has bearing 
on the strategies they can use and how they mobilise (Klüver et al, 2015b: 451). Table 2 contains an 
overview of these subcategories and the variables each in subcategory.  
Table 2. Issue level characteristics 
Subcategories of the issue level variables Issue level variables Description  
Issue characteristics relating to how  
many actors are active on a file 
 
Saliency 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conflictual nature 
 
 
When attention paid to an 
issue by the public and 
politicians increases, 
likelihood of narrow 
interests being successful 
decreases. 
 
When a proposal’s impact 
is limited to one policy 
area, narrow interests have 
greater influence. When a 
proposal impacts multiple 
policy areas, narrow 
interests are less 
successful. 
 
The number of actors 
involved in lobbying and 
whether lobbying was 
contentious or not. When 
issues are more 
conflictual, business 
interests are less likely to 
be successful. 
 
Issue level variables pertaining to content  
and nature of the policy 
Policy type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Complexity 
 
 
Proposal can be of 
regulatory, distributive, or 
redistributive nature. 
Policy type affects which 
types of groups mobilizes 
for to lobby for or against 
a proposal. 
 
Relates to how much 
technical expertise is 
required and the scope of a 
proposal. The more 
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complex an issue, the 
more expertise required. 
This tends to favour 
business associations and 
firms. 
Issue background History 
 
 
 
Nature of the status quo 
 
 
 
 
 
New issues may be of 
more interest to the public.  
 
Whether groups are 
advocating in favour of the 
status quo or against it 
affects their strategy 
choices, decision to 
mobilize or not and may 
determine how much 
influence they have. 
Methodology and case selection         
 
To study the way the business lobby succeeds at blocking proposals case study is conducted. The case 
studied is the Commission’s 2012 proposal to achieve gender balance on corporate boardrooms. The 
case selected for this study was chosen because of its attributes. The case constitutes an instance where 
a proposal by the Commission was blocked. This is also a case where business interests appear to have 
been successful in blocking a proposal. As Commission proposals are rarely blocked, this case 
constitutes a deviant case. That is, the case defies an empirical pattern and hence warrants further 
examination (Herron & Quinn, 2016: p. 472). Analysing this measures can, thus, help to identify what 
the reasons are, as well as provide insight into the role business plays in blocking legislation.
 Qualitative research is useful in interest group studies. Case studies can provide valuable 
insight into the validity of theoretical propositions on small number of cases. Qualitative research 
yields lower external validity than quantitative research, but can provide richer and more detailed 
accounts of the cases studied. This allows for better understandings of the effects of contextual factors 
that structure interest group politics, such as the tactics employed or the framing processes of actors 
involved (Voltolini & Eising, 2016: p. 4).      
Data Selection 
 
The primary means of obtaining data will be official documents of the European Commission and the 
European Parliament, as well as the submissions made by affected stakeholders during the public 
consultations. The Commission conducts public consultations whenever they are planning on initiating 
a major policy proposal (Klüver, 2013b: p. 66). The responses by stakeholders to these consultations 
can be useful in approximating preferences and positions of stakeholders involved in the process. 
Relying on these contributions comes with downsides though: such consultation, while being useful in 
identifying who is in favour or against a proposal, does not necessarily tell you what actors are likely 
to prioritise among the list of issues involved in a proposal. So, gauging success solely by analysing 
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these consultation responses might be problematic. Another problem with relying exclusively on 
contributions to the consultations is that much of the context is absent. While stakeholders might 
formulate a position paper, their activity on a case may not be limited to doing that. Therefore, relying 
on consultation contributions alone would give an incomplete picture of the lobbying activity of 
actors. Amendments tabled in the European Parliament will also be analysed. This is another source of 
data, from which changes as well as proposed changes can be gleaned. To gauge public saliency 
mentions of this Directive in newspapers across three countries were tallied in the period of 2011-2013 
when the Directive was being worked on. The newspapers in question were the Volkskrant 
(Netherlands), Süddeutsche (Germany) and the Financial Times (UK).    
 To counteract these downsides, a limited number of semi-structured interviews will be 
conducted to supplement the data from the consultation contributions. The benefits of interviews in 
this case are numerous: the interviews can highlight what different stakeholders prioritised in the 
process; whom they considered influential actors in the process; what their tactics and strategy was; 
how influential they thought they were themselves; their rationale for acting; the language they use 
themselves in describing the events; and other potentially important contextual information not 
provided by mere policy papers. Using both archival data as well as interviews improves the validity 
of a study. Interviews have their own downsides: the subjects are likely to be more knowledgeable 
than me with regards to the proposal and process and might try to mischaracterize their role in the 
process. They may also simply misremember events (Babb et al, 2012: p. 84; Bruter & Lodge, 2013: 
pp. 170-171).           
 Subjects for the interviews are selected through a snowball sample. A total of five policy 
officers representing five interest groups are interviewed. The people interviewed for the case study 
are representatives from the following groups: BusinessEurope, the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists (ERT), the European Women Lobby (EWL), VNO-NCW and the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC). A legal officer in the Commission involved in crafting the bill is also 
interviewed. A total of eight other groups have been asked and declined to participate in this study. 
These concerned primarily individual firms who had responded to the consultations. 
Data analysis 
 
Background of the proposal 
 
Combatting the underrepresentation of women on Europe’s boardrooms has long been a goal of the 
Commission and the EU’s social partners (ETUC, UNICE, UEAPME & CEEP, 2005). At the time the 
Directive was being worked on, only 8.9 percent of executive and 15 percent of non-executive board 
members were women (European Commission, 2012a). In 2010 Commissioner Reading (Directorate-
General Justice and Consumers) promised to introduce measures if the number of women on boards 
did not increase noticeably within the year.       
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 Some Member States had taken steps to correct gender imbalances on boards. These steps 
ranged from legal quotas with sanctions, enacted by France, Italy and Belgium; procedural quotas 
without sanctions, i.e. a comply or explain model, taken by the Netherlands and Spain; voluntary 
targets introduced by the UK; and other smaller scale measures (European Commission: Directorate-
General Justice and Consumers, 2012a: pp. 13-14). This led to discrepancies in the representation of 
women on boards between the Member States. Moreover, the different requirements concerning board 
compositions across the Member States were deemed a trade barrier by the Commission (European 
Commission, 2012b: p. 4).        
 Gender balance in decision-making bodies is purported to improve the quality of decisions. 
The idea being that if the composition of boardrooms resembles society at large, they will have a 
better sense of what their customers want. In addition, gender balanced boards are said to improve 
corporate governance, making companies more socially responsible (European Commission, 2012b: p. 
4). There are different views about when organizations are ‘gender balanced’. The most commonly 
used threshold for when an organization has reached a tipping point is 30%. Once this threshold has 
been passed, gender roles in an organization are said to shift and gender based stereotypes begin to 
disappear (EWL official, March 31, 2017). The Commission set 40% as the target as that was deemed 
a reasonable middle ground between aiming for critical mass of 30% and full gender parity at 50% 
representation of women (European Commission, 2012c, p. 5). The board seats the Directive would 
potentially apply to are the executive director positions and non-executive director board positions. 
The difference between these two is that the non-executive directors have supervisory role, while 
executive directors are involved in the day-to-day management of a company (European Commission, 
2012c, p. 11).           
 As progress on gender balance in boardrooms was not being made fast enough in the eyes of 
the Commission, it decided to work on ‘targeted initiatives’. The first of these initiatives was the 2011 
“Women on the Board Pledge for Europe”. Business leaders and social partners committed to 
increasing the number of women in decision-making bodies up to 30% by 2015 and 40% by 2020, on 
a voluntary basis. This did not produce satisfactory results either. Increases in the number of women 
represented on boards remained meagre. Furthermore, increases were not equally divided across the 
Member States. Some Member States saw larger increases than others, while others even saw 
decreases (European Commission, 2012c, p. 2). For this reason the Commission started working on 
more binding measures. The plan announced by the Commission was a quota system. The 
Commission conducted public consultations with stakeholders to get their views on the matter. These 
stakeholders ranged from Member States, business and professional associations, citizen groups, 
individuals and other entities with an interest in the proposal.    
 Subsequently, the Commission produced a proposal. The proposal does not stipulate how 
Member States have to achieve the objective. The proposal does not include sanctions for companies 
that do not achieve the 40% objective. Companies that did not have gender balanced boards had to 
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meet certain procedural requirements. The proposed law would give companies a three year window 
before checking whether sufficient progress had been made. If progress was found to be lacking, 
companies had to explain which steps had been taken to address this problem. So the proposed quota 
amounts to a procedural quota. Compliance with the Directive comes down to being able to show the 
concrete steps taken to address gender imbalances. There was debate within the Commission over 
whether a legal quota might not be more desirable. But in an effort to accommodate the Member 
States and their concerns regarding subsidiarity and proportionality a procedural quota was chosen 
(Commission legal officer, 2017, June 8). The Member States were charged with devising the 
sanctions for companies that did not comply with the Directive. Also, the proposal would only apply 
to publicly listed companies and not to small and medium sized firms (European Commission, 2012c 
p. 3).  
Institutional factors 
 
The Commission phase 
 
The Directive was proposed and worked on primarily by Directorate-General Justice, in their Gender 
Equality unit. Promoting gender equality is part of the organization’s core mission (European 
Commission: Directorate-General Justice and Consumers, Gender Equality). This Directive was a 
priority for the DG producing it. This meant that, for business interests, the DG producing it was 
unlikely to be particularly receptive to their arguments. 
 The Commission has informational needs (read demands) it had to meet. The Commission 
sought out business stakeholders on this matter. Since this measure affects businesses in different 
sectors, the primary business associations active were the cross-industry business associations. The 
main Euro-level business association is BusinessEurope. All interview respondents named 
BusinessEurope as the main stakeholder lobbying against the measure (ETUC official, May 3, 2017; 
EWL official, March 31, 2017; Commission official, June 8, 2017; ERT official, May 22, 2017). The 
interviewed BusinessEurope official stated that they mainly provided legal and technical information 
to the Commission about board selection procedures in different countries (BusinessEurope, April 14, 
2017). They seemed to have had some success in this phase: the proposal did not include a legal quota 
or automatic sanctions for businesses that did not comply with the law. 
 
The European Parliament phase 
 
Following adoption by the Commission the bill moved to the European Parliament. The bill was 
processed in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, where the European Parliament is a co-legislator. 
The picture painted by Dür et al (2015) regarding the European Parliament’s role and impact on 
business interest groups’ likelihood of success seems to be confirmed. However, the reasons given by 
Dür et al for this do not seem to hold. Dür et al claim that business groups to lobby executive agencies 
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and citizen groups to lobby assemblies more. But the European Parliament and European Commission 
were cited by the official representing BusinessEurope and the official of the ERT interviewed for this 
study as one of the two main targets of their lobbying efforts (ERT senior advisor, 2017, May 22; 
BusinessEurope senior advisor, 2017, April 14).      
 There seems to have been broad support for the bill in the Parliament. This is evidenced by the 
fact that the Parliament had already adopted a resolution on women and business leadership in 2011. 
Therein they called on businesses to ensure that women made up 30% of their decision-making bodies. 
The rapporteurs and co-rapporteurs on the file had all been in support of the Directive. Business 
interests thus faced an unfavourable environment in the Parliament. The changes to the bill in the 
Parliament also indicate that citizen groups were more successful in attaining their preferences, 
whereas business interests had relatively little success. The Parliament further specified the range of 
sanctions companies are to be subjected to for not meeting the requirements, calling on companies not 
in compliance with the Directive to be excluded from public procurement offers. Also, exemptions for 
businesses in industries where less than 10% of the workforce consists of women was removed by the 
Parliament (Commission Legal officer, 2017, June 8). Overall, the lobbying efforts of business 
interests seemed to have yielded little in terms of results in the Parliament phase. 
The Council phase 
 
Following adoption by the parliament the bill went to Council. As previously stated, a number of 
Member States were hesitant to take action. Only a few documents are available about this stage of the 
process. Council meetings are unfortunately not well documented. This means other sources have to 
be used to approximate the positions of the Member States. Several Member States responded to the 
consultation. From the Member State consultations and the responses of Member State Parliaments 
paint a clear picture though. The Parliaments of the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Sweden and the Netherlands expressed concerns about the bill on the grounds that the Directive would 
be in violation of the subsidiarity principle (see the letters written by Member State Parliaments for 
this). The Portuguese and Rumanian parliaments expressed concerns about the bill’s method, opposing 
it on the grounds that they reject affirmative action policies. More puzzling are the Member States that 
opposed this initiative, despite already having domestic legislation in this regard. Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom for example all had national initiatives addressing gender 
imbalances on boards, but nevertheless still opposed the proposal (European Commission: Directorate-
General Justice and Consumers, 2012a: p. 13-14). This is also commented on by the Commission 
official interviewed: “Some Member States objected on grounds of subsidiarity and proportionality. 
But they seem to have misinterpreted or not even read the bill. The bill does contain an exemption 
clause for countries with their own measures in this regard. Nonetheless some countries with their own 
measures object to this Directive” (Commission legal officer, 2017, June 8).   
 The bill has been deadlocked in Council since its adoption by the European Parliament in 
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2014. There have been unsuccessful attempts to break the deadlock, especially during the Luxembourg 
Council Presidency in 2015 (Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Luxembourg, 
2015, 18 and 19 June). The Presidencies following the Luxembourg Presidency effectively kept the 
issue of the agenda. This is something remarked upon by the representative of the ETUC in the 
interviews (ETUC advisor,2017, May 3). In general, a Council Presidency opposed to a proposal has 
the ability to keep a proposal off the agenda or otherwise arrange the agenda in such a way that less 
time is devoted to a proposal (Commission legal officer, 2017, 8 June; Hayes-Renshaw, 2009: p. 75). 
Multiple interview subjects remarked on the Dutch and Slovakian presidencies as problematic for the 
success of the Gender Balance dossier (Commission legal officer, 2017, 8 June; ETUC advisor, 2017, 
May 3).  
Interest group level variables 
 
With regards to the information supply, the coalition approach makes most sense in this case. The 
sheer number of groups active in lobbying, in addition to the similarities in positions of actors in the 
two camps makes analysing this case at the individual group level not workable (Klüver, 2013b). The 
fact that there were two clear camps also suggests that aggregate information and lobbying camps 
approach is more apt for analysing this case. Looking at the aggregate information supply, the number 
of actors responding in opposition to the proposal (105) was substantially higher than the number of 
groups and in favour of the proposal (56)
1
. Not all stakeholders are created equally though. 
Recognised social partners are likely to carry more weight. In this case for example all national 
business associations largely agreed with the position of BusinessEurope. Hence they largely deferred 
to BusinessEurope on this dossier (VNO-NCW policy advisor social affairs, 2017, May 18). 
 With regards to the specific information provided by business groups, the following can be 
said: the business stakeholders interviewed stated legal and technical expertise as the information type 
provided (BusinessEurope senior adviser, 2017, April 14; ERT senior advisor, 2017, May 22), 
whereas the unions and citizen groups interviewed stated political information about the levels of 
public support and expertise about the workings of quota systems (ETUC advisor, 2017 May 3; EWL 
policy and campaign officer, 2017, March 31). Lastly, with regards to citizen power and economic 
power, it can be maintained that the case does not provide for enough variation to assess the effects of 
both.  
Issue level variables 
  
Of the three subcategories of issue variables, the first subcategory contained factors that related to the 
number of actors involved. The dossier seemed to have high saliency. The Directive was mentioned a 
total of six times in the Volkskrant, six times in Süddeutsche and a total of eleven times in the 
Financial Times. Using Mahoney’s (2008: p. 53) sample of proposed Directives and the saliency of 
                                                          
1
 For a complete overview of the consultation responses see table 3 in the appendix.  
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those Directives as a benchmark, this Directive was mentioned as often as the most salient proposals 
in her sample. A second way to measure saliency is actor saliency. This is done by asking actors how 
important a proposal was to them. All actors interviewed, save for the ETUC official, mentioned this 
issue as being a priority (the BusinessEurope official stated that this Directive was a priority in this 
issue area)( BusinessEurope senior adviser, 2017, April 14; ETUC advisor, 2017 May 3; EWL policy 
and campaign officer, 2017, March 31; VNO-NCW policy advisor social affairs, 2017, May 18). The 
second variable related to number of actors involved was scope. This Directive affected one policy 
area, namely corporate law. However, this was an issue that affected actors across different sectors. 
Greater scope is said to reduce the chances of narrow interests being successful. Moreover, there is an 
argument to be made that the business lobby did not represent narrow interests as such in this 
Directive. This Directive’s impact was not limited to a small number of actors who would incur all the 
costs. The last variable in this subcategory was conflictuality. The number of actors involved in this 
case was not low. A quick scan of 15 other Directives proposed by the Commission indicates the range 
of stakeholders responding to the consultations varies between 20 on the low end and 500 on the high 
end. The gender balance Directive had nearly 500 responses. That is an indication that this was a high 
scope issue. Whether lobbying was contentious remains difficult to entangle from interviews and 
readings. What these three factors do show is that a large number of actors were active, and that, as 
such, a large number of views and stakeholders had to be accommodated. This was therefore not 
conducive to business interests’ odds of success.      
 Looking at the second subcategory of issue level variables, the issue seemed to have been 
opaque and complex. The nuances between procedural quotas and legal quotas seemed to not have 
been understood. The Commission expressly chose for procedural quota to accommodate the Member 
States. “The impression of stakeholders and the Member States was that this Directive would 
introduce legal quotas (European Commission legal officer, 2017, June 8).” Mistaking procedural 
quotas for legal quotas is an easy mistake to make. People might intuitively assume that if a quota is 
introduced, that the quotas requirements are meeting the target. This is not the case with the procedural 
quota. This was the chosen instrument to allay concerns about subsidiarity and proportionality by the 
Member States. Whether this misunderstanding was chance or wilful, the effect that remains is that it 
contributed to the proposal being blocked in the Council.   
Conclusion 
 
This thesis started out asking the question why and how business interests succeed at blocking EU 
proposals. To this end, factors at three levels which structure lobbying strategies and outcomes have 
been analysed. The interest group level variables do not provide a solid explanation for why this case 
was blocked. Looking at aggregate information supply, the numbers of actors opposed to the proposal 
outnumbered the number of proponents. But that was mainly regarding a potential legal quota. There 
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were two clear camps in this case: a side consisting of business interests and a side consisting of 
unions and citizen groups. This is unlikely to be a unique circumstance though. It is likely that the 
positions of business actors align closely in multiple other cases. Those cases are nonetheless not 
blocked. So these factors do not explain why this initiative was blocked.   
 Looking at the institutional factors, there was strong support for the proposal in the 
Commission and Parliament. Changes made to the bill in the Commission and Parliament stage 
indicate mixed success of business interests in these stages of the process. Their most notable success 
was the removal of the legal quota in favour of a procedural quota. But even a procedural quota was a 
loss to business interests. Furthermore, in line with expectations, the Parliament seemed least receptive 
to the arguments of the business lobby. The bill was blocked in the Council stage. The Commission 
anticipated difficulties in the Council and was conscious of concerns Member States had regarding 
subsidiarity and proportionality of the measure. As such, they added the flexibility clause and also 
opted for a procedural quota. The flexibility clause specifically exempted Member States with national 
initiatives from the requirements of the law. However,  this did not assuage Member States to change 
their vote. The ministers in the Council seem to have conflated the legal and procedural quotas, as well 
as neglected the flexibility clause. It remains unclear why they conflated the procedural and legal 
quota. This is especially puzzling for countries who presumably qualified for the flexibility clause, e.g. 
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. A possible explanation is that they might not 
have been willing to agree to this because it was difficult to explain to domestic audience. The Dutch, 
German and UK governments consisted of coalition governments with right wing and conservative 
parties governing in all three countries. For these parties the nuances between the two quota systems 
might have been difficult to sell to domestic supporters.  It could also be the effect of strategic framing 
by opponents or miscommunication by the Commission and proponents.  
 Limitations of this study include the fact that the number interviews conducted was relatively 
low. All the major stakeholders were interviewed, but the inferences made from this study may have 
been more valid if more subjects had been interviewed, especially if actors from different Member 
States had been interviewed. Unfortunately, this was not possible, as several interest groups which 
were approached to participate in this study declined. Furthermore, lobbying of and via the Member 
States is not adequately covered in this study. As this decision was blocked in the Council at least 
lobbying efforts by actors at the Member State level needs to be accounted for better. Lastly, it is 
conceivable Member States coordinate their lobbying efforts with interests groups. Future research on 
EU lobbying could focus on the nature of their cooperation.  Future research on this topic could also 
be helped by a larger number of cases. The findings from this study may only apply to this case. 
Comparing multiple cases could assist in drawing stronger conclusions about the causes of business 
success in this blocking legislation.   
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Appendix 
 
Interview questions for the stakeholders 
1. How did you arrive at your position?  
2. At what stage did your organisation become active on this dossier?  
3. Why did the EC make this proposal? 
26 
 
4. What was (or were) the most contentious issue(s) according to you? 
5. Did you lobby for all of these measures, or just some? And did your lobby goals change over 
time, in the EC, EP and Council stage? 
6. Did this proposal receive enough press coverage in your opinion? 
 
Lobby Targets 
 
1. Were you active at multiple venues, or did you focus your efforts mainly on one institutional 
actor? 
2. Who did you try to influence?  
3. What kind of resources (time, expertise, knowledge, money) does your organisation 
possess/offer? 
4. How much of your resources did you use on this dossier, and how does this compare to your 
resource usage for issues? 
5. Are there specific European agencies or organisations, outside of the EC, EP and the Council 
you consider important for this legislative proposal and whom you provided information to? If 
yes, who are they? And did you engage in such exchanges with them rarely, sometimes, 
frequently or very frequently? 
Coalitions 
6. Can you please indicate the actors who were the most active in lobbying on this proposal? 
7. In order to influence EU policies advocates may forge coalitions. I understand coalitions as 
explicit agreements between you and other actors, aimed at coordinating efforts to influence 
EU legislation. If you were involved in this type of activity can you indicate with whom you 
formed a coalition to influence the legislative outcome of this proposal? 
8. What was the nature of your cooperation? Information sharing or other forms of coordination? 
9. Most important actor(s) lobbying against this proposal? 
10. What their tactic was/is, and who they approached? 
Framing 
 
1. Did you change your messaging or frame depending on the institution or actor? 
2. What kind of information did you stress? 
- Technical; 
- Economic; 
- Legal and or administrative; 
- Political consequences? 
 
Activities: 
What concrete activities did you engage in, and how often?  
1. Organize press conferences or distributed press releases  
2. Publish research reports and brochures  
3. Active involvement in media debates such as giving interviews, editorials, opinion letters… 
Place advertisements in newspapers and magazines  
4. Contact reporters and journalists to increase media attention  
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5. Encourage members and supporters to lobby policymakers, start a letter-writing campaign or 
to sign petitions directed at public officials  
6. Stage protest activities involving members and supporters (strikes, consumer boycotts, public 
demonstrations)  
7. Publish statements and position papers (on your own website)  
8. Hire commercial consultants (agents who are paid to try to influence policy-makers on behalf 
of your organization) 
Stakeholder positions 
 
Unfortunately not all the consultation responses were retrievable. Because of this 141 of the 302 
consultation responses are not available. Moreover, not all consultation responses are published. The 
Commission gives groups a choice over whether their contributions can be made public or not. A self-
selection bias may thus be present here, resulting in some groups or views could therefore be 
overrepresented. The Commission received a total of 485 responses to the consultations. 23 responses 
from public authorities and 275 responses from organizations. Responses by individuals were 
excluded from the analysis, as their role is not relevant to the research question. These individuals 
tended to be researchers who wanted to share their expertise. 161 responses consultation responses 
remained available for analysis. The table contains the organizational type of the group responding to 
the consultation and their position. This table shows that groups representing business interests, 
regardless of organization type, were nearly unanimously opposed to the quota system. Citizen groups 
and professional associations are, broadly speaking, more likely to support quotas.  
Table 3. Position on the gender balance Directive %(n) 
Type of organisation In favour Opposed Responded 
Citizen group 66 
(31) 
33 
(16) 
100 
(47) 
Cross-industry 
business association 
10 
(2) 
91 
(19) 
101 
(21) 
Sectoral business 
association 
15 
(2) 
85 
(11) 
100 
(13) 
Cross-industry 
professional 
association 
44 
(4) 
56 
(5) 
100 
(9) 
Sectoral professional 
association 
57 
(8) 
43 
(6) 
100 
(14) 
Individual firm 8 
(3) 
93 
(37) 
100 
(40) 
Public authorities 27 
(3) 
73 
(8) 
100 
(11) 
Research institutions 63 
(5) 
38 
(3) 
101 
(8) 
Total 35 
(56) 
65 
(105) 
100 
(161) 
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Others/unavailable - -  (141) 
 
Source: Consultation submissions to the public consultations on the Gender Balance Directive 
 
 
